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Responsibility in the Financial Crisis
TOM SORELL
The global financial crisis began in 2007, and we are still feeling its effects. It involved 
the collapse or near- collapse of large commercial banks, hugely expensive interventions 
by governments to guarantee deposits and buy bank assets, a steep decline in bank 
lending to individuals and businesses, significant falls in consumer activity both domestic 
and international, and a resulting reduction in trade. Government indebtedness due to 
the crisis has resulted in diminished welfare states in Western Europe and a worsening 
of the position of the worst off in developed countries. In the United States, repossessions 
of properties rose very markedly after 2006, and members of both low- and middle- 
income groups have at times been very badly affected.
Two natural and related questions about the crisis are “What caused it?” 
and “Who, if anyone, is to blame?” Neither admits of a simple answer. The 
first is caught up with the difficulty of establishing an uncontroversial narrative 
of the crisis that is suitably related to data on previous, more local, financial 
crises.1 The problem of a reliable narrative also affects the question of blame-
1. The literature on financial crises identifies at least four distinct types, which in practice often 
overlap. The criteria for identifying an event as a crisis of a particular type are disputed, as are the 
explanations for how each occurs. Such uncertainty also creates challenges for identifying the real 
effects of crises. On these points, and their relation to analysis of the recent crisis, see Stijn 
Claessens and Ayhan Kose, “Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implications,” IMF 
Working Paper WP/13/28, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40283.0
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worthiness, which, in addition, is beset with philosophical complications. If people 
involved in the crisis are blameworthy, they have to have contributed in signifi-
cant ways to the collapse of large commercial banks, the credit shortage, and 
so on. The scope for individual responsibility for such large- scale effects may 
at first appear to be slight. And although there have been journalistic attempts 
to identify guilty individuals, these assignments of blame are disputable.
Some people say that a bad “culture” grew up in banking in the years 
leading up to the crisis, and that this, more than individual action, or this 
rather than individual action, operated to create the crisis. Even if this view 
is wrong, and there are identifiable guilty, and therefore blameworthy, people, 
should we blame them? This question bears two senses, depending on whether 
blame is interpreted as an attitude or a public practice. Although there may 
be people who feel qualms about adopting even the attitude of indignation 
toward bankers or regulatory authorities, I will proceed as if this is unduly 
charitable or purist. More controversial may be a public practice of blaming 
bankers, say by imprisoning or fining some of them, or short of that, bringing 
them before parliamentary committees, demonstrating outside bank headquar-
ters in the City of London or Wall Street, running press campaigns aimed 
at forcing resignations, or exchanging derogatory comments about individual 
bankers and bankers in general on social media.
Should bankers be blamed through public practices? Sometimes there 
can be good reasons for not publicly criticizing or punishing people who are 
responsible for wrongdoing. For example, it might make sense not to blame 
people who blame themselves already and who do what they can to put things 
right. Differently, it might make sense not to blame people who, though they 
were in charge when things went wrong, were as conscientious as anyone 
could be, but were ineffectual even so. Do any of these reasons for not blam-
ing people apply to the banking crisis? No. Although some of the investigatory 
reports on the banks try to enter into patterns of financial thinking prior to 
2007 in order to see whether decisions were unreasonable by standards pre-
vailing at the time,2 this seems to ignore the fact that standards in 2007 were 
themselves a conscious departure from standards that in the recent memory 
of bankers were taken to be demanded by prudence. Nor was the financial 
crisis so big and so complex that the actions of individuals dwindle into insig-
nificance. According to me, some individuals do stand out as reasonable targets 
of opprobrium, complex as the crisis is. This is because they occupied positions 
2. For example, the UK Financial Services Authority’s report into the failure of the Royal Bank 
of Scotland accepted that the RBS management and board made poor decisions, but found that 
they were not sanctionable under law or the FSA rules because processes and controls were not 
clearly deficient, and the decisions were not outside the bounds of reasonableness, given the 
information available at the time. See Financial Services Authority, “The Failure of the Royal 
Bank of Scotland: Financial Services Authority Board Report,” http://www.fsa.gov.uk/rbs. The 
U.S. government’s Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission likewise blames institutions more often 
than individuals. See Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in the United States (subsequently abbreviated FCIC) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2011.
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of leadership or authority in which they enjoyed considerable latitude to act 
and make far- reaching decisions. These people were not new to their positions 
when the crisis started, and their duties certainly extended to informing them-
selves about and judging the risks of activities that led to the crisis.
This is not to say that every piece of wrongdoing in the crisis can be 
apportioned to specific people: sometimes it may be plausible to speak of 
corporate failure—in the sense that there was a questionable consensus in an 
organization about what was permissible that no one person orchestrated or 
created. Again, regulatory failure is likely to be ascribed to institutions, unless 
there are special reasons to believe otherwise—for example, a history within 
the institution of general deference to some one person within it, or a man-
agement structure assigning great authority to a particular office within it. 
But the idea that, in general, the responsibility for the banking crisis can 
only be collective, or that it attaches itself to a noxious culture that insulates 
people from personal blame, seems to me to be wrong.
I shall outline a framework that permits responsibility in the crisis to be 
ascribed to individuals as well as institutions. This framework leans heavily on 
the idea that banks in general have distinctive public purposes, that roles in 
both banks and regulatory bodies are well  enough defined to permit moral 
judgment of actions within these roles, that actions within these roles are sup-
posed to be judged—by the public, designated insiders, and regulators—and that 
some decisions taken within these roles were highly damaging in the early 2000s. 
Size and connectedness also matter. Big banks whose fortunes affect a national 
banking system are spectacularly unsuitable sites for recklessness. A national 
banking system has some claim to belong to the Rawlsian basic structure of a 
liberal democratic jurisdiction, and “systemically important” banks affect the 
banking branch of the basic structure. If decisions made by ostensibly private 
actors in private banks can predictably unhinge the banking system, those osten-
sibly private decisions, private roles, and private institutions are strongly public- 
aspected, and carry special responsibilities that attach to individuals who lead 
banks. In a sense, executives of big, system- affecting banks play public roles, 
and not just after big banks have been bailed out by governments. Nor does 
personal responsibility in those roles make bankers answerable only to share-
holders and regulators, since the safe- keeping of the banking system is bound 
up with the vital interests of a whole citizenry in developed countries.
I
The main events of the financial crisis (at least at its epicenter in the United 
States in 2007–2008) have been summarized in the Introduction to this volume. 
Complex as those events certainly were, they were not acts of God or the 
components of a natural disaster. Most, if not all, resulted from decisions 
within financial institutions and regulatory bodies, primarily in the United 
States. The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Report makes a lengthy and well 
 documented case for holding responsible the Federal Reserve and other 
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regulatory agencies in the U.S. financial sector. These agencies, the report 
shows, were given timely information about problems in the subprime market, 
including fraud and predatory lending, and were also aware of accounting 
problems in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that predated the events summa-
rized in Table 1 of the Introduction.
The regulators either did nothing or too little. As for the private sector, 
many important risk- taking decisions directly related to the events in Table 1 
can be traced to decisions by executives in banks, money market funds, and 
insurance companies. Some of these decisions seemed imprudent to dissenting 
senior insiders when they were made, and were even matters of dispute lead-
ing to resignation. It is not only in hindsight, then, and not only to outsiders, 
that these decisions seemed irrational. After discussing the case against the 
regulators, I shall go on to give examples of some of the decisions that arose 
within financial institutions. As will emerge, some of those decisions are natu-
rally attributed to individuals within those institutions rather than the institu-
tions themselves.
According to the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry,
[regulators] had ample power in many arenas and they chose not to use 
it. To give just three examples: the Securities and Exchange Commission 
could have required more capital and halted risky practices at the big 
investment banks. It did not. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
and other regulators could have clamped down on Citigroup’s excesses 
in the run- up to the crisis. They did not. Policy makers and regulators 
could have stopped the runaway mortgage securitization train. They did 
not. In case after case after case, regulators continued to rate the institu-
tions they oversaw as safe and sound even in the face of mounting trou-
bles, often downgrading them just before their collapse. And where regulators 
lacked authority, they could have sought it. Too often, they lacked the 
political will—in a political and ideological environment that constrained 
it—as well as the fortitude to critically challenge the institutions and the 
entire system they were entrusted to oversee. (FCIC, p. xviii)
The Federal Reserve Board in Washington comes in for particular criticism, 
because at least one of the Fed governors, Ed Gramlich, was very sensitive 
to problems in the mortgage market as early as 2000 and voiced them in 
public, but apparently thought he could make no headway in the Fed Board 
more generally. The Fed’s leader—Alan Greenspan—believed deeply in the 
capacity of markets to regulate themselves. In 2002, bad mortgage lending 
practice had gotten out of control, partly because the institutions involved 
believed that securitization had the effect of spreading risk and also that sup-
posedly low- risk tranches of securities really were low- risk. In fact, judgments 
of risk relied on credit rating agency models of risk that were very defective 
(FCIC, p. 28) and had been influenced by the banks themselves.
Problems with regulation went beyond failure to curtail high- risk lend-
ing. There was the fact that different financial institutions could choose between 
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federal and state supervision, and between recognized regulators at each juris-
dictional level.3 This created a kind of market in regulators in which the 
more lenient were likely to be chosen by institutions legally required to have 
oversight (FCIC, p. 20). Again, in the early 2000s, stringent state regulation 
of predatory lending and other bad lending practices was judged to interfere 
unlawfully with certain federal regulatory prerogatives, thereby undermining 
some tightening up of lending that might otherwise have taken place. In this 
way, the clash between state and federal governments and a competition 
between them to grant bank charters aggravated the failings of what was 
already an ineffective regulatory regime.
Within investment banks themselves, many decisions were made that 
seemed questionable to insiders before and during the period covered by 
Table 1 (see Introduction). A number of these decisions were directly relevant 
to the failure of Lehman, which in turn arguably marked the high point of 
the crisis. For example, some decisions made in 2008 within Lehman were 
supposed to reverse declines in its share price after the collapse of Bear 
Stearns. Lehman tried to reassure investment analysts who doubted that Lehman 
was sound, and it also put pressure on regulators to outlaw “shorting” of its 
shares.4 Regulators were unreceptive to the pressure, and the reassurance 
offensive was also unsuccessful. At the heart of the failure of the latter was 
the fact that Lehman assets—many of them mortgage- backed securities—were 
overvalued, and that there was confusion even at high levels in the firm about 
the accounting conventions used to communicate their values. “Mark to mar-
ket” measures gave an up- to- date valuation, but Lehman used figures that 
were only updated quarterly. This meant that the valuations were unduly 
optimistic.5 The same optimism had affected declarations for investors and 
regulators close to the time of the failure of Bear Stearns that Lehman had 
a strong balance sheet, and that it was therefore not next in line to fail or 
to seek a buyer for its distressed assets.
Long before Lehman reached crisis point, its chief executive officer, 
Richard Fuld, and its president, Joseph Gregory, had backed heavy investment 
in real estate—investment ranging from direct purchases of famous New York 
office buildings and massive residential development projects on the Florida 
and California coasts, to securitized mortgages. Fuld and Gregory had backed 
the judgment of Lehman’s real estate director, Mark Walsh, who gained a 
reputation for bold, high- risk deal- making. When the property market started 
its decline, this aggressively developed line of business made its own 
contribution to Lehman’s failure. Although the decision to concentrate 
3. Richard J. Rosen, “Switching Primary Federal Regulators: Is It Beneficial for U.S. Banks?” 
Economic Perspectives 29, no. 3 (2005):16–33.
4. Shorting or short- selling takes place when shares are borrowed from brokers and sold—in 
the hope that they can be repurchased later at a lower price, and returned to the lender at a profit 
to the short- seller.
5. For a vivid and detailed account of how these accounting unclarities led to a highly influential 
recommendation by a hedge fund manager called David Einhorn to sell Lehman shares in May 
2008, see Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail (London: Penguin, 2009), 100ff.
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investment in real estate is not on its face a case of wrongdoing, it was 
arguably imprudent and to that extent a step on the way to the precarious 
position reached later by Lehman.
Many other examples can be given of bad decisions in organizations 
that have already figured in the summary of the crisis given in the Introduction. 
AIG’s decision to involve itself deeply in credit- default Swaps is one example. 
As has already been seen, this generated unsatisfiable collateral demands when 
Lehman was on the point of failing. Reserve Management made a bad deci-
sion to start to invest in mortgage- backed securities when it had previously 
invested only in U.S. government- issued securities. This was not a decision 
that seemed uncontroversial at the time it was made, as it was the subject 
of a disagreement between the father and son who ran Reserve Management.6 
The folly of these decisions was magnified by the holdings of both AIG and 
Reserve Management in Lehman. Further examples of imprudent commercial 
behavior can be found in organizations at one remove from Lehman. There 
were the disproportionately real estate– focused strategies of both Merrill Lynch 
and Citigroup, allied to their policies of borrowing huge amounts over a long 
period to finance investments.
The decisions underlying the strategies of the Wall Street institutions 
we have mentioned do not only appear questionable to people looking back, 
or from vantage points outside these businesses and their culture. In the case 
of Lehman particularly, there were many insiders who openly expressed doubts 
about Gregory’s management of the business and Fuld’s loyalty to him.7 And 
Fuld’s policy of trying to win over external critics of the business to protect 
its share price exposed him directly to their very substantial grounds for doubt 
about the strength of Lehman’s balance sheet. The question of whether these 
weaknesses—rather than purely speculative shorting—might be at the source 
of the decline in the Lehman share price does not appear to have been taken 
seriously by Fuld until it was too late.
II
We are now in a position to return to the question raised at the beginning: 
can blame be directed at individuals and institutions in the crisis, and ought 
it to be? That institutions bear some of the responsibility seems not to be 
in doubt. The Fed on one hand, and, on the other, a host of financial insti-
tutions, all appear to have failed to judge the various risks involved. Sometimes 
these misjudgments appear to have arisen through misinformation within 
organizations—as in Citigroup—and sometimes through critically weak account-
ing methods. In the case of the regulators, the failure seems partly to have 
arisen from a dogmatic attachment to laissez-faire in the financial markets. 
Another contributing factor may have been successful lobbying by the banking 
sector.
6. James B Stewart, “Eight Days,” New Yorker (September 21, 2009): 69–71.
7. Sorkin, 124ff.
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Institutional responsibility cannot be the whole story, however, because 
even competing narratives of the financial crisis agree that many poorly judged 
policies had identifiable and powerful individual backers or originators high 
up in some of the different institutions involved. These were no mere bystand-
ers or more or less equal players in a big team effort. Rather, they initiated 
or gave backing to policies that went wrong; they overruled dissenters lower 
in the hierarchy; and they sought to placate rather than to listen to big inves-
tors and financial journalists who put their fingers on the genuine problems: 
notably, too much investment with borrowed money, and too much exposure 
to real estate and real estate– backed securities.
Richard Fuld of Lehman and Sanford Weill of Citicorp presided over 
very protracted periods at large financial institutions; Stan O’Neall, who led 
Merrill for a relatively short period, fired thousands of employees and replaced 
many of its top executives, as well as beginning the policy of highly leveraged 
investment and concentration on securitized real estate products.8 He was not 
single- handedly responsible for all the trouble Merrill got into, but neither 
was he merely one among many agents whose respective small actions added 
up to the cause of the firm’s problems. On the contrary, his actions were 
bigger than those of other people in Merrill, and even though the crisis did 
not reach its peak while he was in charge, the actions he took when he was 
in a leading role contributed to Merrill’s weakness when the crisis came. The 
same, for reasons already explained, is true of Fuld, and others.
These facts have a bearing on explanations of the crisis that invoke 
collective responsibility. Although corporations have the kind of unity and 
organization and deliberative powers that seem to permit ascriptions of respon-
sibility to them and not just to the individuals who work for them, it does 
not follow that, when institutions are responsible, they are responsible to the 
exclusion of individual responsibility. On the contrary, in corporations where 
top executives are given considerable discretion to plan, hire, fire, and invest, 
both the organization and individuals at the top can be appropriately praised 
or blamed.
Not that people at the top of financial institutions or regulatory authori-
ties are solely to blame in the financial crisis. Some people at the bottom of 
the heap—some with very low incomes who knew that they would not be 
able to repay big loans, but who took them on anyway—those people, too 
are blameworthy. So are people in the middle who overborrowed for no better 
reason that they were keen to make money out of rising house prices or were 
impatient to finance consumption that could have waited. Still, there is a dif-
ference between the irresponsible person at the bottom of the heap and those 
at the top. The ones at the bottom took the consequences of their imprudence 
by losing the roof over their heads and their access to credit. Even the dis-
advantaged who did not borrow irresponsibly suffered. This is because the 
public money that has been used to repair the damage to the financial system 
has depleted the resources available for the welfare state. In this way the 
8. Sorkin. 143ff.
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imprudent subprime borrower on a low income has been punished consider-
ably more severely by the financial crisis than even quite irresponsible bank 
executives. The imprudent subprime borrower has been punished not only with 
repossession and sometimes personal bankruptcy but also by a thinning of the 
public safety net that they have come to need more since 2007.
By contrast, many of those at the top of banks that failed have suffered 
little more than public disapproval and the loss of jobs they did not need in 
order to live comfortably or better. Top bankers who were fired have remained 
extremely wealthy. It got much worse for the disadvantaged, but imprudent lead-
ing bankers have suffered very little or not at all. Not only have many of them 
continued to live in luxury, but, as individuals, they also have suffered less and 
less vilification the more the events summarized in Table 1 have receded into the 
past.
The condition of the bankers contrasts with that of many other groups 
of people, even if we disregard those who are most reliant on the welfare 
state. Among the relatively well off who have reason to resent the bankers 
are middle-class people whose pensions and other investments lost much of 
their value through no imprudence of their own; managers and employees 
in sound small businesses who are affected by the continuing credit short-
age; and unemployed but well  educated young people whose prospects were 
worsened by a very long- lasting economic recession in the whole of the 
developed world. These people, when combined with the worst off, may not 
add up to 99 percent of the population, as the Occupy movement claims. 
But they are numerous and have been significantly harmed by the financial 
crisis.
III
What theoretical understanding of responsibility enables us to make sense of 
the intuition that leading bankers have been unduly insulated from the conse-
quences of their decisions? I shall make use of a framework that was developed 
to discuss the apparent insulation of public officials from blame for actions 
done within their official roles. It may seem that this framework is inappropri-
ate for the responsibility of bankers, since bank executives are not public offi-
cials. I shall argue, however, that the framework fits after all, because of the 
way that the actions of big- bank officials in the early 2000s affected the banking 
system, and because of the way bank officials sought to sidestep or dismantle 
regulation that was a key component of that system, and that was partly mor-
ally motivated. The banking system has a special public status that executives 
in the biggest banks, through their ostensibly private sector roles, are sometimes 
in a particularly good position to damage. The fact that bank executives in the 
crisis, sometimes self- consciously, acted to change regulation of the system self- 
interestedly, gives their actions a public dimension. Differently, the fact that 
some leaders of big banks knew that their banks were systemically linked to 
other banks through elaborate counterparty arrangements, sometimes involving 
very large amounts of debt, makes it plausible to say that they were aware of 
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their banks’ systemically important status and yet did little or nothing to reduce 
the risk taking that exposed not only their banks but also the banking system 
to crisis. In particular, they are open to the criticism of acting unjustly, and 
not just of making poor or disastrous business decisions.
In order to spell out this line of thought, we need to distinguish big 
from small banks, banks from the banking system, and also banks from other 
kinds of big business. The banking system in a capitalist economy is supposed 
to make savings available for productive investment. It is supposed to do this 
for both individual and commercial borrowers. This intermediation between 
investors and savers is supposed to occur without loss to savers, and indeed 
with a return to savers as well as banks. This is supposed to be accomplished 
by the differential between interest rates charged to borrowers and interest 
rates offered to savers. Since the class of savers in a developed country can 
include most of its population, there is a significant overlap between the class 
of savers and the class of citizens. Again, since a system for holding savings 
securely is likely to be a precondition of accumulating wealth, and of systematic 
economic exchange, commercial retail, and wholesale banking—not just central 
banking—has a claim to be politico- economically fundamental. This distinguishes 
the banking sector from other business sectors. Furthermore, since personal 
wealth is both a Rawlsian primary good and an important component of per-
sonal welfare, the banking system has a good claim to belong to the Rawlsian 
basic structure—that is, to belong to the set of institutions involved in the 
distribution of goods that are available for the realization of Rawlsian life 
plans.
The banking system is not just the total number of banks interacting 
with one another and with savings and borrowers, but this together with the 
relevant regulatory institutions and their enabling and other legislation. In the 
United States, the regulatory institutions include, as we have seen, the Federal 
Reserve system at both the national and regional levels, and state regulators. 
A particularly important piece of legislation for the banking sector before 
the period immediately leading up to the crisis was the Glass- Steagall Act, 
which was introduced at the time of the Great Depression, and was super-
seded in 1999. This Act prohibited U.S. banks of an earlier era from engaging 
in several of the banking strategies that contributed to the current crisis. 
These include the following:
1. The development of products—offered in the 2000s through money mar-
ket funds—that simulate retail bank without being subject to the capital 
requirements and accounting rules of retail banks;
2. Significant borrowing by banks from other banks, large companies, and 
sovereign wealth funds to finance investments; and
3. Significant merger and acquisition activity involving retail banks on the 
one hand and insurance companies and investment dealers on the other.
Not all major banks participated equally in these developments in the decade 
after 1999. In particular, JPMorgan Chase was considerably less leveraged 
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than its competitors, and less exposed to real estate.9 But many major banks 
that have already been mentioned in our narrative were party to these changes,10 
which together had the effect of weakening the U.S. banking system and not 
just individual banks.
Because the Glass- Steagall Act was in force for such a long time, there 
is a sense in which it defined the culture of pre- 1999 banking in the United 
States. Against the background of the Great Depression, the act sought to 
eliminate lending for speculative investment, and it imposed capital require-
ments on banks designed to make them able to resist runs. It encouraged 
lending for “commercial” as opposed to “speculative” investment, and it limited 
interest rates for savers while insuring their savings up to certain limits.11 
The Wall Street banks collectively, through lobbyists, were important undoers 
of Glass- Steagall. They supported the Bank Modernization Act. This relaxed 
or abolished prohibitions on links between commercial and speculative bank-
ing. Individual Wall Street banks also lobbied for the relaxation of laws 
restricting predatory lending as well as bankruptcy.12
Not only banks corporately but also individual bankers pressed for deregu-
lation. Foremost among these was Sanford Weill of Citigroup, who was per-
sonally involved in the negotiations between the White House and Congress 
that led to the Bank Modernization Act. It was Weill who hung up in his 
office a large piece of wood inscribed with his portrait and the legend, “Shatterer 
of Glass- Steagall.”13 The Bank Modernization Act of 1999 legalized acquisitions 
and mergers between retail deposit takers, investment banks, and insurance 
companies. Citigroup was associated with the takeover of Traveler’s Insurance 
before such a takeover was legal. It is hard not to conclude that the Bank 
Modernization Act, whatever else it may have had to recommend it, was 
backed by Weill partly because it made possible the creation at Citigroup of 
a single institution offering the whole spectrum of financial services.14
9. Its strength put it almost uniquely into a position to rescue another major financial 
institution, as it did in the government-assisted rescue of Bear Stearns. Very recently it, too, has 
been revealed to be involved in the kind of high-risk and highly speculative investments that it 
prudently avoided at the height of the crisis. Its huge losses in the so-called “London Whale” affair 
have damaged its reputation at a time when many other tainted banks seem to have begun the 
return to solvency and profit. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/11/dimon-london-
whaleapology_n_3060811.html
10. See Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next 
Financial Meltdown (New York: Pantheon, 2010), chs 4–6.
11. On the other side, it also permitted a choice for banks between federal and state regulation, 
a permission that we have seen encumbered measures against predatory lending in the early 
2000s.
12. See Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the 
Financial Crisis (IMF Working Paper 09/287, 2009) who give details for Bear Stearns and Bank of 
America.
13. See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/business/economy/03weill.html?pagewanted=all
14. The abolition of Glass- Steagall has been proposed as one of the causes of the crisis. See 
http://mises.org/daily/3098
30            Tom Sorell
The influence of at least one banker and many banks on relaxing the 
rules for the commercial operations of banks; doubtful leveraging policies origi-
nating at the top of bank management hierarchies: an over- concentration on 
assets in or backed by real estate also as a matter of the policies of top bank-
ers: all of these things contribute to an explanation of why individual bankers 
are appropriate objects of blame after the crisis; and, in particular, why they 
are appropriately objects of more severe public blame than has actually been 
directed at them. On one hand, they are guilty of a morally objectionable regu-
latory capture—not just an economically objectionable regulatory capture—that 
is, one that carries inefficiencies; on the other hand, they are guilty of a kind 
of imprudence—consisting of high- risk borrowing and lending—that would be 
considered the height of recklessness in private life, and that is particularly 
reckless when engaged in through executive decision making within a bank, 
given that banks are custodians of other people’s money, and operate in a legal 
regime where keeping that money safe is a leading legal requirement.
In order to theorize the injustice of regulatory capture more precisely, 
we need some apparatus from John Rawls, and in order to theorize personal 
responsibility for both regulatory capture and high level decision making within 
banks, we need some apparatus related to Rawls from Thomas Nagel. I come 
to Nagel later.
The apparatus we need from Rawls is the idea of “basic structure” or 
the set of institutions crucial to a correctly principled distribution of Rawlsian 
primary goods.15 The institutions certainly include courts and legislatures, and 
also the family.16 Institutions for regulating the monetary supply and interest 
rates also seem to be included.17 But media organizations seem not to belong 
to the basic structure. They belong to a distinctively pervasive “background 
culture,” which also includes universities and “associations of all kinds.”18
The idea of the basic structure has been criticized for obscurity and 
possible incoherence by G. A. Cohen,19 and I take advantage in my exposi-
tion of some of the clarification that this criticism has provoked from defend-
ers of Rawls. In particular, I take over from Andrew Williams the following: 
(1) that the basic structure is realized by institutions that belong to the 
“informal structure” of society, and not just the set of coercive institutions; 
15. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), §2. See also John 
Rawls,  Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press), Lecture VII.
16. See “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” in John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 156ff.
17. See Theory of Justice, 273: “In conformity with political decision reached democratically, 
the government regulates the economic climate by adjusting certain elements under its control, 
such as the overall level of investment, the rate of interest, and the quantity of money, and so on. 
There is no need for comprehensive direct planning. Individual households and firms are free to 
make their decisions independently, subject to the general conditions of the economy.”
18. Rawls, “Public Reason,” 134n13.
19. G. A. “Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 26, no. 1 (1997): 3–30.
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(2) that the relevant institutions respectively operate by different sets of 
“public” rules; and (3) that social justice is a matter of selecting that com-
bination of coercive and other informal institutions that secure basic liberties, 
fair equality of opportunity, and the maximinization of income and wealth.20
Now banks seem to belong to the basic structure of a society not because 
they are coercive but because they, or at least the banking system, belong 
to the wider “informal” social and economic structure. Again, the banking 
system seems to belong to the basic structure in respect of its “dispositional” 
property of having pervasive effects,21 especially in relation to the maximini-
zation of income and wealth. We have already seen how, when it is in crisis, 
it can worsen the disadvantage of those at the bottom. But there are also 
ways in which it can temporarily advantage the worse off—represented in 
our narrative in the Introduction by subprime borrowers—while eventually 
disabling coercive basic structure institutions for effecting transfers that would 
maximinize. Then there are the trade- offs involved in keeping the banking 
system in equilibrium à la Glass- Steagall in normal times: in return for capi-
talization requirements and ceilings on interest rates that retail banks can 
offer depositors, there is deposit insurance guaranteed by central government 
that prevents runs and the loss of large amounts of savings. Competition 
between savings banks through unregulated interest rate offers for depositors, 
and in the absence of deposit insurance, left many people penniless in the 
Depression. Relatedly, buyers of units in money market funds incurred losses 
when those funds suffered “runs.”
Maximinization apart, there is the role of banks in traditional interme-
diation, that is, in the prudent transformation of savings into investment. It 
is hard to think of a more fundamental function of the economic system for 
both individuals (through mortgages) and (through “commercial investment” 
in the Glass- Steagall sense) for what Rawls calls “associations,” including 
commercial associations, that is, businesses. Of course banks may also have 
other economically useful commercial functions, such as being sources of 
sophisticated acquisition and merger strategy for big businesses, and of meth-
ods of financing that extend well beyond conventional loans of deposits. 
Banks are active in the “repo” market, for example. In the period leading 
up to the crisis, the tendency of banks to be involved in all kinds of inter-
mediation, as well as more risky proprietary trading, made them more embed-
ded in the informal basic structure than they might otherwise have been and 
more of a burden on the formal basic structure, including its legally backed 
bank regulatory and central banking institutions, when things went wrong.
The role of the banking system and the “systemically important banks” 
within the basic structure is part of what connects the actions of certain highly 
placed bankers in big banks with injustice. But what about the personal 
responsibility, if any, of particular people within these institutions? A 
20. Andrew Williams, “Incentives, Inequality and Publicity,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 
(1998): 225–47, esp. 234. Maximinization means maximizing the minimum wealth.
21. Williams, 231.
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framework that helps to organize our thoughts in this area can be adapted 
from Thomas Nagel’s “Ruthlessness in Public Life.”22 Nagel sets out to show 
that public office does not insulate officeholders from personal responsibility 
for wrongdoing committed through their offices. Thus, according to Nagel, 
Robert McNamara was personally (though not solely) responsible for what 
Nagel considers to be criminal U.S. military policy implemented during the 
Vietnam War. He was personally responsible notwithstanding the fact that he 
was pursuing public ends in a war. According to Nagel, public office does 
not free office holders from the obligations of ordinary private morality, but 
the purposes of public offices make results (as opposed to means) count more 
than they do in private life, and the means of accomplishing these purposes 
legitimately include powers that would not normally be available for the pur-
suit of private purposes. These unusual powers may not be used in any way 
an officeholder likes: law and impartial courts are supposed to constrain office 
holders. This explains why, for example, shows of partiality or favoritism may 
be strictly outlawed in public life though they are permissible in private.
The heightened power of public office derives from the public purposes 
of the office. These public purposes are to bring certain publicly recognized 
benefits to groups, including nations. Despite the greater latitude given to 
office holders to pursue such goals as public defense and wealth redistribution 
through means—notably coercion—that are not open to individuals pursuing 
their personal goals, it is not permissible for public officials to pursue public 
goals by whatever means they choose. Avoidable harm and disproportionate 
mass killing are always impermissible in public office and private life alike; 
for example, which is why McNamara’s acting as Secretary of Defense does 
not get him off the hook if a military policy leads to a massacre or the 
targeting of the harmless. In the same way, the fact that any number of bank 
executives were pursuing a legitimate goal—bank profitability—and facilitating 
economic growth when they made a policy of reckless leveraging, does not 
mean that the leveraging was justified after all. Although it is part of the 
role of chief executive to pursue profitability, it is not part of that role to 
pursue profitability by high- risk means, and the reasons for avoiding unneces-
sarily high risk apply in both private and public morality.
In McNamara’s case, the public role of Secretary of Defense did not 
so to speak drown out the contribution of McNamara the man to the execu-
tion of defense policy. On the contrary, as Nagel very plausibly claims, the 
exercise of power through public office can be and often is a means of 
personal self- expression. Although there are certain effects that any Secretary 
of Defense tries to bring about, it is permissible to put one’s own personal 
stamp on one’s execution of the role, and the possibility of being regarded 
personally as one of the great presidents or prime ministers is no doubt one 
of the biggest attractions of those offices. It seems to be similar for leaders 
22. Reprinted in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), 75–90.
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of big businesses. A successor to Steve Jobs who keeps Apple in profit may 
for all that live in Steve Jobs’s shadow, and other personalities have bigger 
profiles than even the high- profile companies they lead: Rupert Murdoch and 
Jeff Bezos might be examples. In the same way, certain banks that were 
prominent in the financial crisis were themselves run by high- profile executives 
who put their stamp on their companies. In this respect, personal involvement 
seems to be as much a feature of leadership in a role in big business as it 
is in government service.
Now the role of bank chief executive is not necessarily a public role in the 
way that U.S. Secretary of Defense is: it is not an appointment subject to legisla-
tors’ vetting of a person’s suitability for it, and the interests the post is designed 
to serve are not primarily those of the public or even the banking sector in 
general. Nevertheless, it has a strong public aspect if decisions made within that 
role significantly affect the survival of the bank, and the role  holder knows that 
his bank is connected to the banking system in such a way that his bank’s failure 
or some decision of his bank would trigger significant disruption to the whole 
banking system.23 In 2008, in New York, the role of chief executive in Lehman, 
in AIG, in Bear Stearns, and in Citigroup had this strong public aspect. For short 
periods, the fate of a single bank seemed to determine that of the banking system, 
and so the commercial obligation of negotiating a rescue became not just a mana-
gerial responsibility but a matter of public obligation, too.
The form this took in the United States was that of an obligation to 
co- operate with the Fed and the U.S. Treasury—agents that were associated 
with coercive power—for the sake of the survival of the banking system.24 
Sometimes the co- operation required one bank to acquire another; at other 
times it required a bank to accept government- dictated terms in return for 
grants and guarantees required for its own survival, and, indirectly, the survival 
of the banking system. In certain cases, the government’s terms proved ques-
tionable, because they were particularly advantageous for commercial “rescu-
ers” and because they were influenced by considerations of party- political 
damage as much as by the survival of the banking system. For example, when 
JPMorgan took over Bear Stearns, it was initially willing to offer $4 per 
share, which meant a huge loss for Bear Stearns shareholders. The Treasury 
Secretary, Hank Paulson, suggested an even lower offer of $2 per share,25 so 
as to dispel the impression that the government- assisted rescue by JPMorgan 
was in any way bailing out Bear Stearns. Since that was exactly the impres-
sion that the rescue of Bear Stearns created, the main beneficiary of the 
Paulson- dictated share price was JPMorgan.
23. The term “systemically important bank” has only been added very recently to regulatory 
instruments in the United States, the United Kingdom, and globally. For one of the most recent 
pieces of international guidance, see Bank for International Settlements, “Global Systemically 
Important Banks: Updated Assessment Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency 
Requirement” (July, 2013), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.htm
24. In the United Kingdom, similar obligations fell upon executives in Lloyds, RBS, and 
Northern Rock.
25. Sorkin, 37.
34            Tom Sorell
More objectionable than the advantageous terms offered to some banks 
at the height of the crisis was the effect of bank lobbying on banking law 
before the crisis. Banks were able to influence in their favor the legal regime 
governing their operations. This widened the area of the legally permissible 
in ways that Nagel’s model of the constraints on public office holding does 
not anticipate. Nagel’s model treats public offices and associated institutions 
as in turn constrained by further independent institutions, including judicial 
and legislative institutions, subject to strong norms of impartiality allied to 
serving the public interest. By being able to lobby for legislative change that 
was friendlier to the business plans of investment banks and mortgage origi-
nators, or combined investment bank/mortgage originators, the banks, both 
collectively and individually, brought it about that banking legislation did not 
realize strictly public purposes, but rather the purposes of the banking sector. 
And some figures in leading positions in the biggest banks were personally 
responsible for this regulatory capture, as Sanford Weill’s wall decoration 
proclaimed. Regulatory capture reduces the claim of an office with a strong 
public aspect to insulate its holders from responsibility for what is done through 
that office. In this way, individual bankers may be more guilty than McNamara, 
though of wrongdoing that is less than lethal.
IV
The upshot of the position being argued for in this article may appear to be 
close to that of some journalistic pilloryings of the bankers, such as Time 
Magazine’s ‘‘25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis.’’26 It is true that 
some of the people already mentioned figure in Time’s list. Sanford Weill and 
Richard Fuld do; so does Alan Greenspan. I agree that these people have 
personal responsibility (though of course not sole responsibility) for elements 
of the financial crisis. But there are important points of difference between the 
approach behind the Time list and my own, which accounts for some disagree-
ments between a list that would be suggested by this article and the list sug-
gested by Time.
Time sometimes chooses an individual to personify a regulatory institu-
tion or bank. So, for example, Chris Cox is high on its list of blameworthy 
people, because he was in charge of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) at the time of the crisis, and it was within the power of the SEC to 
require more prudent leveraging from the banks. In this case my approach 
would be to ask whether in fact Chris Cox was the SEC in any important 
sense. The more powerful and long- lived the leader, the more the leader’s 
strategy is the bank’s or regulatory institution’s strategy, then the more per-
sonification makes sense. But it does not follow from the fact that someone 
is in charge that they are the organization in any interesting sense. So I am 
26. See http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1877351_1877350_1877339, 
00.html
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not sure that on my approach Cox is important to mention. (The SEC already 
has been mentioned.) Distinctions can also be made between bankers on 
Time’s list. In particular, Stan O’Neall was not related to Merrill as either 
Richard Fuld or Sanford Weill were related to Lehman or Citigroup, respec-
tively. The latter two do have some claim to have personified the organiza-
tions they led. In the case of O’Neall, that is not so. So while all three bear 
personal responsibility on my account as well as Time’s, O’Neall has a weaker 
claim to be on the list, or a claim to be on the list different from Fuld and 
Weill, because he did not personify Merrill.
An important problem for Time’s approach emerges when one comes 
to the “person” listed fifth in its register of the blameworthy. This turns out 
to be no individual at all but rather “American consumers.” Why this group 
counts for only one in the list of twenty-five is unclear. Surely, it ought to 
expand the number on the list from twenty-five into the hundreds of millions. 
In any case, here is what Time says about this class of guilty people:
In the third quarter of 2008, Americans began saving more and spend-
ing less. Hurrah! That only took 40 years to happen. We’ve been bor-
rowing, borrowing, borrowing—living off and believing in the wealth 
effect, first in stocks, which ended badly, then in real estate, which has 
ended even worse. Now we’re out of bubbles. We have a lot less wealth—
and a lot more effect. Household debt in the U.S.—the money we owe 
as individuals—zoomed to more than 130 percent of income in 2007, 
up from about 60 percent in 1982. We enjoyed living beyond our means—
no wonder we wanted to believe it would never end.27
My account has also mentioned individual borrowers who knowingly speculated 
on the property market rather than invested in a place to live, and those 
who would not defer consumption until it was within their means. But these 
people do not add up to the class of American consumers, even if most 
Americans or many Americans are in debt and do not save enough. Again, 
many of the people who speculated and who should have deferred consump-
tion do not, on my account, deserve public blame. Many of them personally 
suffered the consequences of their imprudence—through personal bankruptcy 
or repossession of their houses. Public blame in addition is unnecessary.
My account has focused on those whose actions were much more far- 
reaching, whose imprudence was much more damaging than that of the small- 
scale property speculator, and who have not had to cope with much more 
unpleasantness as a result than being included in a list like Time’s. These 
people have gotten off unduly lightly, on my account. Still, the number of 
people in the group of well off and seriously damaging agents is probably 
not very large. It is certainly much smaller than the class of American bank-
ing executives, smaller even than the class of American executives in companies 
27. See http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1877351_1877350_1877319, 
00.html
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as central to the crisis as Countrywide or Citigroup, for even in those organi-
zations there were people in powerful roles who could see big risks and who 
tried and failed to get things done differently. My account is geared to what 
I called the strong public aspect of decisions in banks that were able to affect 
the whole banking system. My account directs serious blame at relatively few 
people, people whose roles—I hope to have shown—are inevitably strongly 
publicly aspected ones, even though they are discharged in the private 
sector.
